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THE POST-CONVICTION CLAIM THAT 
UNITES DEATH ROW 
Emily Levy* 
INTRODUCTION 
“. . . [D]eath-penalty cases are different from other criminal 
cases, due to the obvious finality of the punishment.”1 
Thirty-one executions have taken place in Arkansas since 
1990.2  In February of 2017, Arkansas, uniquely, sought to 
execute eight inmates in eleven days—the so-called “Arkansas 
Eight.”3  All of those death row inmates shared a common post-
conviction claim: Strickland.  Prior to Strickland v. Washington, 
no Supreme Court jurisprudence made clear what constituted 
objectively sufficient defense representation pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment.  But that changed in 1984 when Strickland made 
clear that the Sixth Amendment included the right of effective 
assistance of counsel.4   
Consider, for example, Ledell Lee, a member of the 
Arkansas Eight, who was executed in April of 2017.5  His story 
presents an unremarkable set of attorney errors that ultimately 
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of law school. The author also thanks the entire Arkansas Law Review for their countless 
hours editing, cite checking, and reviewing. The author would like to thank her family, 
Andrea, Paul, and Ilyse, for their unwavering support throughout law school, who never 
hesitated to lend an ear or assist in any way possible. Lastly, but not least, the author would 
like to thank Kyle for his constant unconditional love and support. 
1. Ward v. State, 347 Ark. 515, 517, 65 S.W.3d 451, 453 (2002) (emphasis added).
2. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, EXECUTIONS (2020),
[https://perma.cc/4X83-VRT6]. 
3. The “Arkansas Eight” Update: Three Stays Remain in Place, One Granted
Clemency, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 1, 2017), [https://perma.cc/GDX9-A26T] [hereinafter 
Arkansas Eight]. 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
5. Ed Pilkington & Jacob Rosenberg, Arkansas Executions: First Prisoner Killed After
Legal Challenge Fails, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/K5G3-MCRV]. 
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should have resulted in the court finding that there was ineffective 
assistance of counsel.6  His case was so glaring that his sister, 
Deborah Young, continued to declare Lee’s innocence after his 
execution.7  Young filed a complaint on January 23, 2020, 
“seeking an order of this Court directing the release of physical 
evidence in Defendants’ custody for DNA testing and fingerprint 
analysis.”8  With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and The Innocence Project, Lee’s family hopes to exonerate Lee’s 
legacy.9 
The Strickland Court decided on a two-prong standard to test 
whether a criminal defendant receives constitutionally ineffective 
representation.10  First, whether counsel’s performance was 
“deficient,” and second, whether the attorney’s performance 
“prejudiced” the defendant.11  “Deficient,” said the Court, means 
that an attorney’s “representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”12  According to the Court, reasonableness is 
evaluated objectively in the context of professional norms, 
although a reviewing court should “indulge a strong presumption” 
that the attorney acted within the “wide range” of permissible trial 
strategy.13  Collectively, the Court clarified, the standard was 
designed to promote a just outcome for criminal defendants.14   
The second prong of the standard requires the defendant to 
prove that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of 
his case.15  That is, the standard requires that “but for” the 
insufficient performance, the outcome would have been 
different.16  The Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]n error by 
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant 
6. See infra Part I.D “Ledell Lee.”
7. Complaint at 1, Young v. Jacksonville Police Dept., et al., No. 60CV-20-639
(Pulaski Cnty., Ark. Jan. 23, 2020); Dakin Andone, Ledell Lee Was Executed in Arkansas in 
2017. A New Lawsuit Says He Was Innocent, CNN (last updated Jan. 24, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/K3WZ-QEKY]. 
8. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1; Andone, supra note 7.
9. Andone, supra note 7.
10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 688.
13. Id. at 689.
14. See id.
15. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
16. Id. at 694.
2021 POST-CONVICTION 801 
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error 
had no effect on the judgement.”17  The Court reasoned that an 
attorney’s mistake is just as likely to be prejudicial as it is to be 
benign.18  The second prong, therefore, prevents a defendant from 
succeeding on this claim, making the standard unattainable. 
This Article argues that Arkansas should adopt a higher 
constitutional standard for what constitutes “effective” counsel 
for death penalty cases pursuant to Arkansas’ Sixth 
Amendment.19  In that narrow context, it should eliminate one 
part of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Strickland v. Washington.  Part I tells the story 
of each member of the “Arkansas Eight.”  Part II, first, explores 
the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington.20  Part II then 
demonstrates that—quite remarkably—all inmates currently on 
the Arkansas death row share a common claim: constitutionally 
deficient counsel.  Part III contends that Arkansas should expect 
more from defense lawyers in death penalty cases.  The stories of 
the representation provided to the death row defendants demand 
a change to the Strickland standard.  Dropping the prejudice 
prong for death cases is an effective and proactive way to extend 
the right that is seemingly inherent to each and every person: 
adequate representation.   
17. Id. at 691.
18. Id. at 693.
19. The life of a criminal trial takes the following path: investigation, arrest, booking,
post-arrest investigation, charging decision, complaint filed, judicial review, first 
appearance, preliminary hearing, arraignment, motions, discovery, plea negotiations, trial, 
sentencing, appeals, and collateral remedies.  BRIAN R. GALLINI, INVESTIGATIVE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: INSIDE THIS CENTURY’S MOST (IN)FAMOUS CASES 2-13 (2019).  But after 
sentencing, a criminal defendant has the ability to challenge the decision, known as a Post-
Conviction Proceeding and Relief. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1.  The challenge must be on one of 
the following grounds: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution 
and laws of the United States or this state; or” (2) “that the court imposing the sentence was 
without jurisdiction to do so; or” (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
sentence authorized by law; or” (4) “that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack[.]”  Id.  Post-Conviction claims are in large part the main place this article lives. 
20. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); See infra Part IIA.
802 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW  Vol.  73:4 
I. 
“Carrying out four executions over the course of a week, as 
Arkansas did, stands alone in the modern history of capital 
punishment in this country.”21 
Strickland has, to say the least, played a prominent role in 
some of the highest-profile capital litigation in the state of 
Arkansas.  Consider: in 2017, there was a rush order on 
executions when the Governor of Arkansas, Asa Hutchinson, 
ordered that eight inmates be put to death during an eleven-day 
span.22  “The Arkansas Eight,” as they became known, included 
Bruce Ward, Don Davis, Stacey Johnson, Ledell Lee, Marcel 
Williams, Jack Jones, Jason McGehee, and Kenneth Williams.23  
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed the executions of 
Bruce Ward, Don Davis, and Stacey Johnson, and Governor 
Hutchinson granted clemency to Jason McGehee, four inmates 
were executed within seven days from April 20 through April 27, 
2017.24  This condensed period of time caused a flurry of 
litigation that ultimately produced four stayed executions.25  A 
common claim united the filings: Strickland.  Part I discusses the 
part Strickland played in the rush order of executions in 2017 
through profiles of each inmate. 
A. Bruce E. Ward
Nearly twenty-eight years earlier, in 1989, Bruce Ward 
killed Rebecca Doss at a Little Rock, Arkansas, gas station.26  The 
Pulaski County jury convicted Ward and sentenced him to the 
death penalty.27  During Ward’s trial, the circuit judge refused the 
defense’s side-bar objections, while allowing the prosecution’s.28  
After his conviction and sentencing, Ward appealed to the 





26. Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2009).
27. Id.; Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 418, 827 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1992).
28. Norris, 577 F.3d at 928.
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Arkansas Supreme Court.29  Although the court affirmed Ward’s 
conviction, it remanded for re-sentencing.30  The jury, again, 
sentenced Ward to death.31  But because the court reporter for 
Ward’s proceeding did not accurately record the proceedings or 
include the number of bench conferences, a third sentencing 
followed.32  Yet again, the jury sentenced Ward to death, and this 
time, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.33 
Ward sought post-conviction relief by arguing that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge[] the judge’s 
actions or move[] for the judge to recuse on the ground of bias” 
during trial.34  During the post-conviction hearing, the court held 
that the circuit court judge’s denial of side-bar objections only to 
the defense “did not reflect actual or presumed bias rising to the 
level of a constitutional violation or a structural error.”35  The 
court reasoned that “unfavorable” lower court rulings do not 
constitute a Strickland claim.36  Ward, however, did not assert that 
the court’s judgment formed the basis for his Strickland claim.37  
Rather, he focused on his attorney’s failure to object to the judge’s 
actions.38  The reviewing court, nevertheless, denied post-
conviction relief.39   
B. Don Davis
Don Davis’s story began in 1990, a year after Ward killed 
Doss.  When Richard Daniel returned home on October 12, 1990, 
he found his wife, Jane Daniel, lying in blood.40  A Benton County 
jury convicted Davis of Daniel’s murder, as well as burglary and 





33. Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 936.
35. Id. at 937.
36. Id. at 937-38.
37. See id. at 936.
38. See Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 937 (8th Cir. 2009).
39. Id. at 938.
40. Davis v. State, 314 Ark. 257, 261, 863 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1993).
41. Davis, 314 Ark. at 260, 863 S.W.2d at 260.
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Strickland required a new trial because his attorney failed to cite 
a case indicating that a criminal defendant is “entitled to an 
independent psychiatric examination.”42  The court disagreed and 
held that even if Davis’s trial counsel cited that particular case, 
there is no indication that it would have produced a different 
outcome.43  Therefore, according to the court, Davis did not 
receive inadequate representation.44 
C. Stacey Johnson
In 1993, Stacey Johnson became the third man to join the 
Arkansas Eight.  In April of that year, Carol Heath was killed 
while her two children, ages two and six, were home.45 Heath’s 
daughter, the six-year-old, described the person who was in the 
house as “‘a [b]lack man.’”46  After the incident, an officer 
showed the six-year-old daughter two sets of pictures of black 
males and she picked Stacey Johnson both times.47  At trial, the 
daughter could not testify due to resulting trauma from the 
incident, but the trial court permitted the officer to testify as to 
what the six-year-old told him after the incident.48  Johnson 
argued on appeal that Strickland required a new trial because his 
counsel failed to (1) present information regarding the six-year-
old’s competency and recollection of that night, and (2) request 
retesting of DNA evidence, among other Strickland claims.49  The 
court held that counsel was not inadequate for failing to challenge 
the daughter’s competency and for not attempting to retest the 
42. Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Coulter v. State, 304 Ark.
527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991)). 
43. Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005).
44. Id. at 878.  In 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed Davis’s execution while
waiting on a decision from the United States Supreme Court.  Alan Blinder, Court Decisions 
Force Arkansas to Halt Execution, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5BX3-
M8WQ]. 
45. Johnson v. State (Johnson I), 326 Ark. 430, 434, 934 S.W.2d 179, 180 (1996).
46. Id. at 435, 934 S.W.2d at 180.
47. Id. at 437, 934 S.W.2d at 182.
48. Id. at 442-44, 934 S.W.2d at 184-86 (while the court held that the statements
regarding the photo lineup could not be classified as an excited utterance, the court did 
classify the six-year-old’s statements as excited utterances, thus providing an exception to 
the hearsay rule). 
49. Johnson v. State (Johnson II), 356 Ark. 534, 541-43, 552, 157 S.W.3d 151, 158-
59, 165 (2004). 
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DNA evidence.50  The court, however, did decide to retest the 
evidence on other grounds.51 
D. Ledell Lee
Like Stacey Johnson, Ledell Lee’s story also began in 1993.  
A Pulaski County jury sentenced Ledell Lee to death for the 
murder of Debra Reese.52  The jury rendered its verdict after 
listening to the prosecution’s closing argument, wherein it stated 
that “Lee ‘is a hunter.  This is his habitat.  And his prey were the 
people of Jacksonville from 1990 to 1993.  And the people of 
Jacksonville didn’t even know they were being hunted.’”53  Lee’s 
counsel responded in his closing: “who are we then to say that we 
are going to kill Ledell Lee?”54  The prosecutor then rebutted with 
“I will tell you who we are.  We are the hunted.”55  Lee’s counsel 
did not object.56  Although the circuit court scrutinized the 
prosecutor’s statements as “improper,” the judge ruled that the 
statements were not “so egregious and inflammatory that the 
defendant was denied a fair trial[,]”57 and affirmed Lee’s 
conviction, holding that Lee did not receive inadequate counsel.
58  The court reasoned that objecting during opening or closing 
arguments is highly debated and that the decision to do so is 
within the attorney’s discretion via trial strategy.59  At a hearing 
for a new sentencing trial, his former trial representation testified 
that he did not hear the prosecutor’s closing statement and did not 
object because he “just missed it.”60  Despite the attorney’s own 
50. Id. at 551-52, 157 S.W.3d at 164-65.
51. In 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed Johnson’s execution for post-
conviction DNA testing. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. 138, at *1. 
52. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 1, 308 S.W.3d 596, 599-600.




57. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
58. Id. at 20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
59. Id. at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608; see also Buckley v. State, No. CR 06-172, 2007
WL 1509323, at *4 (Ark. May 24, 2007) (explaining “[e]xperienced advocates might differ 
about when, or if, objections are called for because, as a matter of trial strategy, further 
objections from counsel may succeed in making the comments seem more significant to the 
jury.”). 
60. Lee, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
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admission that he “just missed it,” and the detrimental impact the 
statements had on the jury, the court held that the jury’s sentence 
would not have been different, because of the testimony about 
Lee’s various violent crimes.61  Despite Lee’s claims, he was 
executed on April 20, 2017.62 
E. Marcel Williams
Marcel Williams, the fifth of the Arkansas Eight, not 
surprisingly, also brought a Strickland claim.63  Marcel Williams 
faced the death penalty for capital murder, kidnapping, rape, and 
aggravated robbery.64  Ultimately, after hearing the evidence 
along with the attorney’s arguments, the Pulaski County jury 
convicted Marcel Williams of all charges and sentenced him to 
death.65  In November of 1994, Williams met Stacy Errickson at 
a Shellstop gas station.66  Williams forced Errickson into the front 
passenger seat, drove her car away from the gas station, and made 
her withdraw money in eighteen different transactions from 
automated teller machines.67  Later that night, Williams raped and 
killed Errickson.68  The Circuit Court appointed two attorneys for 
Williams at trial, and an additional non-appointed attorney 
volunteered to assist.69  Collectively, their strategy was to 
“admit[] guilt to the jury and seek[] mercy through a punishment 
of life without parole.”70  Despite the attorneys’ strategy, 
Williams’ team  failed to present any mitigating evidence of their 
client’s “troubled background.”71  Williams advised his team of 
attorneys about his lack of a good home life, previous time in the 
61. Id. at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
62. Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 5; see also Complaint, supra note 7; Andone,
supra note 7. 
63. Williams v. State (Williams II), 347 Ark. 371, 373, 64 S.W.3d 709, 711 (2002).
64. Williams v. State (Williams I), 338 Ark. 97, 105-06, 991 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1999).
65. Id. at 106, 991 S.W.2d at 569.
66. Id. at 105, 991 S.W.2d at 568.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 109, 991 S.W.2d at 571.
69. Williams II, 347 Ark. 371, 374, 64 S.W.3d 709, 712 (2002).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Department of Correction, and that he was allegedly raped while 
in prison when he was just sixteen.72   
At a post-conviction hearing assessing Williams’ 
insufficiency of counsel claim, trial counsel admitted that “they 
felt they should have done things differently, . . . at the time of 
trial, they did not know any other way to introduce the 
[mitigating] information.”73  Additionally, Williams’ team 
testified that they should have, after researching more about the 
process of the mitigation phase, sought a psychologist to advise 
the jury of Williams’ background.74  One of the attorneys even 
admitted, “‘[I]t wasn’t that we didn’t have mitigation, [it was] that 
we were ignorant of how to present it without exposing him.’”75  
Because the attorneys indicated that they defended Marcel 
Williams to the best of their ability “at the time with the 
knowledge [that] they had[,]” the court evaluated the 
representation’s performance from their mindset and conduct at 
the time of trial.76  Despite the attorney’s unfamiliarity with the 
process of presenting mitigating evidence, the court held that it 
was a rational trial strategy that did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.77  The court reasoned that a finding 
of inadequate representation is without merit unless the defendant 
provides actual evidence that might have “changed the mind of 
one of the jurors.”78  Marcel Williams was ultimately executed on 
April 24, 2017.79 
F. Jack Jones
Jack Jones’ story began in 1995.  A White County jury 
sentenced Jack Jones to death for the capital murder and rape of 
Mary Philips.80  In June of 1995, Jones went to Phillips’ 
72. Id.
73. Id. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
74. Marcel Williams II, 347 Ark. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 379, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
78. Id. at 380, 64 S.W.3d at 716.
79. Ed Pilkington et al., Arkansas Carries Out First Double Execution in the US for 16
Years, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/ADX7-MDRD]. 
80. Jones v. State (Jones II), 340 Ark. 1, 3-4, 8 S.W.3d 482, 483 (2000).  Additionally,
the White County Jury convicted Jones of the attempted capital murder of Lacy Phillips, the 
808 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW  Vol.  73:4 
workplace where she and her eleven-year-old daughter were 
waiting to attend a 3:00 p.m. dentist appointment.81  However, 
this was not Jones’ first visit to Phillips’ place of work; he visited 
earlier that day to borrow a few books.82  During his second visit, 
Jones robbed, raped, and killed Phillips, and seriously injured the 
eleven-year-old.83  The police proceeded to Jones’s house and 
arrested him as a result of the eleven-year-old’s description of the 
attacker.84  Ultimately, Jones admitted to the crimes. 85   
On appeal for the denial of post-conviction relief, Jones 
argued that his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutions’ 
aggravating statements to the jury that the murder was “especially 
cruel or depraved[,]” and that Jones murdered Phillips to avoid or 
prevent his arrest, rendered him ineffective counsel.86  
Additionally, Jones argued that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the state’s expert witness for a hair analysis 
found on Phillips.87  Jones argued that absent the expert’s 
testimony, he may not have received a death sentence.88  Despite 
this, the court affirmed his conviction and held that Jones received 
adequate counsel.89  The court reasoned that the standard is not 
“that his sentence could have been different” but rather “that [his] 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.”90  Jack 
Jones was executed on April 24, 2017.91 
victim’s eleven-year-old daughter.  Id.; Jones v. State (Jones I), 329 Ark. 62, 64, 947 S.W.2d 
339, 340 (1997). 
81. Jones I, 329 Ark. at 64, 947 S.W.2d at 340.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 64-5, 947 S.W.2d at 340.
84. Id.  Lacy, the eleven-year-old, described Jones as having “a teardrop tattoo on his
face and more tattoos on his arm.”  Id. at 64, 947 S.W.2d at 340. 
85. Id. at 65, 947 S.W.2d at 340.  Jones indicated that he attacked Phillips and her
daughter because “his wife had been raped, and that the police had done nothing about it.” 
Id.   
86. Jones II, 340 Ark. 1, 5, 8 S.W.3d 482, 484 (2000).
87. Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 487.
88. Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 488.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ed Pilkington et al., supra note 79.
2021 POST-CONVICTION 809 
G. Jason McGehee
Jason McGehee joined the Arkansas Eight in 1996.  
McGehee inhabited a house with four other people, including 
fifteen-year-old John Melbourne, Jr.92  The five used stolen 
checks and property to buy things for themselves.93  Melbourne, 
upon order from McGehee, attempted to buy shoes with a stolen 
check, when he was apprehended by the police.94  After 
Melbourne informed the police about the stolen items at the 
home, the police released him to his father.95  McGehee and the 
other inhabitants hid in the house and watched while the police 
took possession of the stolen items.96  That night, Melbourne was 
murdered.97 
McGehee argued on appeal that Strickland required a new 
trial because his counsel failed to request a jury instruction 
indicating that McGehee had accomplices.98  Although the court 
found that McGehee’s counsel rendered deficient performance,99 
counsel’s failure to seek a jury instruction for accomplices “did 
not make any difference in the result of the trial.”100  In August of 
2017, Governor Hutchinson granted McGehee clemency, 
reducing his sentence to life without parole.101 
92. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 399, 72 S.W.3d 867, 869 (2002).
93. Id. at 399-400, 72 S.W.3d at 869.
94. Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 869-70.
95. Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 870.
96. Id.
97. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 400, 72 S.W.3d 867, 870 (2002).  Melbourne
underwent a horrific beating in two different locations involving numerous types of torture. 
Id. at 400-02, 72 S.W.3d at 870-71.  Testimony at trial indicated that the group “agreed that 
Melbourne needed to be taught a lesson.  They decided that upon Melbourne’s return, they 
would beat him to teach him not to ‘snitch.’”  Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 870.   
98. Id. at 403-04, 72 S.W.3d at 872.
99. The court held that “[e]ven though we hold that the issue of accomplice liability
should have been submitted to the jury, had counsel so requested, relief under Rule 37 is not 
required.”  Id. at 409, 72 S.W.3d at 875.  Additionally, “even if Campbell and Diemert had 
been found to be accomplices, their testimony would have been corroborated by other 
evidence tending to connect McGehee with the commission of Melbourne’s murder.”  Id. at 
412, 72 S.W.3d at 878. 
100. Id. at 413, 72 S.W.3d at 878.
101. Max Brantley, Hutchinson Favors Clemency for Jason McGehee, ARK. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/NBP5-LU36].  McGehee was set for execution on April 
27, 2017; however, the Arkansas Parole Board recommended clemency, which delayed his 
execution.  Id..  Governor Asa Hutchinson stated “[m]y intent to grant clemency to Mr. 
McGehee is based partly on the recommendation of the Parole Board to commute his 
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H. Kenneth Williams
Kenneth Williams’ Arkansas Eight story began in 1999.  
Upon his arrival at the Arkansas Department of Correction for a 
different set of crimes,102 Williams escaped.103  Williams ran 
across the highway and found Genie and Cecil Boren’s home, 
where Cecil was alone.104  Genie later found Cecil near the house, 
dead.105  A neighbor, who Williams asked for directions, 
recognized the vehicle that Williams was driving as Cecil’s.106  
The police pulled Williams over in Missouri, but Williams drove 
off and hit a water truck, subsequently killing the water truck 
driver.107  Williams attempted to flee on foot but was captured by 
the police.108  A Lincoln Circuit Court jury convicted Williams 
and sentenced him to death for the capital-murder conviction and 
forty years for the theft.109  On appeal from post-conviction relief, 
Williams argued that Strickland requires a new trial because his 
counsel failed to remove a juror for cause, among other claims.110  
During voir dire, a juror, who was ultimately chosen, told the 
attorneys that “in certain situations death is the only appropriate 
punishment.  She also said that she ‘felt very strong about [the 
death penalty],’ and that she ‘[felt] as though. . .the person that 
sentence from Death to Life Without Parole. . . .  In making this decision I considered many 
factors including the entire trial transcript, meetings with members of the victim’s family 
and the recommendation of the Parole Board.  In addition, the disparity in sentence given to 
Mr. McGehee compared to the sentences of his co-defendants was a factor in my decision, 
as well.”  Id.  Additionally, McGehee’s attorney commented, “Jason’s case offers a prime 
example of why clemency is a necessary part of capital sentencing.”  Id. 
102. In September of 1999, Williams was sentenced to life without parole for “capital
murder, attempted capital murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, theft, and arson[.]” 
Williams v. State (Kenneth Williams I), 347 Ark. 728, 737, 67 S.W.3d 548, 552-53 (2002). 
103. Id. at 737-38, 67 S.W.3d at 553.  Williams was released from his cell to make a
“religious call” when he slipped into a “slop tank[],” which was used to transport items in 
and out of the prison.  Id. at 738, 67 S.W.3d at 553.  When outside of the prison, Williams 
jumped out of the tank and hid in a ditch, where he later ran across the highway and into a 
home.  Id. 
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 739, 67 S.W.3d at 554.
107. Kenneth Williams I, 347 Ark. 728, 739, 67 S.W.3d 548, 554 (2002).
108. Id.
109. Williams v. State (Kenneth Williams II), 369 Ark. 104, 107, 251 S.W.3d 290, 292
(2007). 
110. Id. at 107-08, 111, 251 S.W.3d at 292-93, 295.
2021 POST-CONVICTION 811 
commit[ted] the crime should. . .pay the price for it.’”111  
Williams’s counsel later admitted that he would have challenged 
this juror if he had any challenges left.112  Despite this juror 
expressing that she “favor[ed] the death penalty,” the court held 
that because there was not a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome, Williams was not prejudiced and therefore received 
sufficient counsel.113   
“Four men won court stays, three were executed.”114 
II. 
Part II first explores Strickland v. Washington, the seminal 
Supreme Court case detailing the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  It then explores how Arkansas courts 
utilize the Strickland standard by considering the stories of 
current Arkansas death row inmates. 
A. Strickland Story
The story begins with David Washington.  In September of 
1976, Washington committed numerous crimes over a twelve-day 
period, including murder, theft, and assault.115  The trial court 
appointed William Tunkey—an “experienced criminal lawyer”—
as Washington’s defense counsel.116  Despite Tunkey advising 
Washington to remain silent, Washington confessed and pleaded 
guilty to all charges.117  The trial court sentenced Washington to 
three death sentences and multiple years of imprisonment.118 
The “experienced” Tunkey did not agree with Washington’s 
choice to confess and “experienced a sense of hopelessness.”119  
111. Id. at 111, 251 S.W.3d at 295.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 113, 251 S.W.3d at 296.
114. Melanie Eversley & John Bacon, Arkansas Executes 4th Inmate in 8 Days, USA
TODAY (Apr. 28, 2017), [https://perma.cc/29NW-M4KV] (emphasis added). 
115. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984).
116. Id. at 672; Brian R. Gallini, The Historical Case for Abandoning Strickland, 94
NEB. L. REV. 302, 304 (2015). 
117. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.
118. Id. at 675.
119. Id. at 672.
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This hopelessness led to a series of concerning behaviors perhaps 
best relayed by Richard Shapiro, Washington’s appellate 
counsel.120  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Shapiro 
argued that six specific illustrations of Tunkey’s representation 
best exemplified his ineffectiveness:121 
Tunkey failed to request a continuance following 
Washington’s guilty plea to give himself a reasonable amount of 
time to prepare for the sentencing hearing.122 
Tunkey failed to seek a psychiatric evaluation of his 
client.123 
Tunkey “failed to investigate and present character 
witnesses.”124 
Tunkey failed to seek an investigation report prior to the 
sentencing.125 
Tunkey failed to submit a “meaningful” argument during the 
sentencing phase of the trial to the court.126 
Tunkey failed to obtain an “independent medical 
examination” and “failed to cross-examine the State’s medical 
experts.”127 
The question before the Supreme Court, following a winding 
road of appellate history, was whether Tunkey provided 
“effective” assistance of counsel.128  It preliminarily observed that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of 
counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results.”129  It then settled on a two-prong standard to evaluate 
whether a criminal defendant received constitutionally adequate 
representation: first, whether “counsel’s performance was 
120. Gallini, supra note 116, at 319.
121. Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
122. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1981); Gallini, supra note 116, at
317. 
123. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
124. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286 (emphasis added); Gallini, supra note 116, at 317
(emphasis added). 
125. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
126. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
127. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286 (emphasis added); Gallini, supra note 116, at 317
(emphasis added). 
128. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
129. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
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deficient,” and second, whether the attorney’s performance 
“prejudiced” the defendant.130 
Applying the new standard, the Court upheld Washington’s 
convictions and sentence.131  In construing Tunkey’s performance 
as constitutionally reasonable, Justice O’Connor, writing for a 
majority of the Court, reasoned that Tunkey’s failures were 
justifiably related to his “sense of hopelessness” about 
Washington’s case following the latter’s confession.132  The 
Court further reasoned that although Tunkey was experienced in 
representing capital defendants, he reasonably viewed 
Washington’s case as beyond repair and, therefore, did not fully 
participate in Washington’s sentencing proceedings.133  Even if 
Tunkey’s representation was ineffective, the Court noted, 
Washington was not prejudiced by that performance given the 
overwhelming evidence against him.134 
B. Arkansas: Blurring the Line Between Harmful and
Harmless Errors 
“When a defendant challenges a death sentence. . .the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 
the sentencer. . .would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant 
death.” 135 
The sheer volume of Arkansas Strickland cases brought by 
convicted defendants is overwhelming.136  Although certain 
attorney errors may indeed “prejudice” a defendant’s case, 
Arkansas courts usually classify these attorney “errors” as mere 
130. Id. at 687.
131. Id. at 700.
132. Id. at 699.
133. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).
134. Id. at 698-700.  The sentencing judge determined that the death penalty would be
proper “even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history, [as] no substantial 
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the character evidence offered in the 
collateral attack.”  Id. at 677. 
135. Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
136. The volume of cases involving Strickland claims includes both capital and non-
capital cases; however, this Article focuses solely on death cases. 
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trial strategy.137  Courts have characterized attorney errors as 
“[m]atters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably 
improvident, [they] fall within the realm of counsel’s professional 
judgment and are not grounds for a finding of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”138  With the application of a “strong 
presumption” that every defense attorney’s conduct is within the 
vast scope of “reasonable professional judgement,” a defendant, 
essentially, must show that his representation had virtually no 
strategy for trial.139 
In Arkansas specifically, Strickland’s litigation presence 
transcends the “Arkansas Eight.”  Thirty inmates currently sit on 
death row in Arkansas and they are together connected by one 
thing: a Strickland claim.140  Their claims, though varied, 
generally fall into one of three categories of attorney malfeasance: 
(1) failure to object, (2) failure to prepare for trial, and (3) failure
to present mitigating evidence.
137. See generally Buckley v. State, No. CR 06-172, 2007 WL 1509323, at *4 (Ark.
May 24, 2007). 
138. Id.
139. State v. Barrett, 371 Ark. 91, 96, 98, 263 S.W.3d 542, 546, 548 (2007) (holding
that the defendant received insufficient representation when counsel failed to craft a trial 
strategy and had never tried a capital case). 
140. Death Row, ARK. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Aug. 23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/NLH5-
WVR2].  Currently, there are thirty inmates on death row; however, three of the thirty 
inmates—Brad Smith, Eric Reid, and Scotty Gardner—were recently sentenced and have yet 
to file for post-conviction relief.  Motion for Continuance, Smith v. State, No. CR20-86 (Ark. 
Feb. 10, 2020); Reid v. State, No. CR-18-517 (Ark. June 15, 2018); Gardner v. State, No. 
CR-19-257 (Ark.  Nov. 1, 2019).  It is highly likely that these three death row inmates will 
file for post-conviction relief.  Additionally, inmate Billy Thessing’s record is sealed; 
however, through the unsealed records, it is clear that the inmate sought post-conviction 
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Thessing v. State, No. CR-05-420 (Ark. Apr. 13, 
2005).  Finally, inmate Mauricio Torres was retried in February of 2020; however, another 
mistrial ensued, and he will be re-tried again.  Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for 
Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/V3C7-4DQG]; Courthouse Scuffle Leads to Mistrial in Mauricio Torres’ 
Case, 5 NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6Z3X-UJTW]. 
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1. Failure to Object 141
“The defense should at least indicate its concern . . .”142 
First, failing to object is prejudicial to a defendant’s case and 
detrimental to a jury or judge’s view of the faith the attorney has 
in his or her client.  “‘Objections can be made to questions, 
answers, exhibits, and virtually anything else that occurs during a 
trial.’”143  Without an objection, a jury must interpret the 
prosecutor’s arguments as true and within the rules of evidence.144  
Many death row attorneys indicate that they will not object 
because they do not want to “highlight[] the comment and ma[ke] 
the jury, which might not have understood the significance of the 
remark [initially] [and] pay attention to it [instead].”145  Although 
courts have held that a lack of objection during closing arguments 
is a reasonable trial strategy,146 many statements that go without 
objection reflect poorly on the defendant.  Most notably, the 
closing argument allows each side to refine the evidence and issue 
to the jury.147  Because the closing argument is crucial for a side 
to achieve success, a criminal prosecutor must remember his or 
her influential role for the public at large.  The Supreme Court has 
even articulated that prosecutors shall “prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor. . . .  But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”148  Stated differently, 
141. While this article profiles only two death row inmates under the failure to object
category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim include Randy Gay and 
Jerry D. Lard.  Brief of Appellant, Gay v. State, No. CR-19-762 (Ark. Feb. 7, 2020); Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief, Lard v. State, No. CR-2012-173 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Greene Cnty. Jan. 
29, 2015). 
142. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-
INVESTIGATION 600 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
143. Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections from Beginning to End: The Handbook for
Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 246 (2002) (quoting MAUET, TRIAL 
TECHNIQUES 262 (2000)). 
144. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 142 (explaining that objections to
improper statements made by opposing counsel during closing arguments should be made). 
145. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 391, 993 S.W.2d 901, 910 (1999).
146. LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 142, at 600.  “In some localities, immediate
objections to improper closing arguments are expected, while others consider it a matter of 
common curtesy, verging on obligation, for opposing counsel not to interrupt one another’s 
closing arguments by objections.”  Id. 
147. Id. at 595.
148. Id. at 596-97 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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without objection, the defense substantially decreases its chance 
to zealously argue on behalf of an inmate.149 
Failure to object is best illustrated by Jack Greene’s story.  
Current death row inmate Jack Greene faces the death penalty for 
a capital murder charge.150  The Johnson County jury sentenced 
Greene to death; however, his sentence was reversed, and his case 
was remanded for re-sentencing.151  During re-sentencing, the 
jury, again, sentenced Greene to death after the prosecutor, in his 
final closing argument, declared: 
If someone comes into our community from off somewhere 
and does this to one of our citizens, I think we should tell them, 
‘You get the maximum penalty here.’  Giving the maximum 
penalty discourages and deters other people from doing things 
like this to sixty nine year old retired ministers in Johnson 
County.152 
Greene’s attorney did not object.153  Greene argued that the 
prosecution’s arguments painted him as “‘an outsider’” and 
unconstitutionally compared him to an “illegal alien.”154  
However, the reviewing court reasoned that although “racially 
biased prosecutorial arguments” are unconstitutional, the sole 
notion that Greene is an outsider did not stem from the 
defendant’s race or his ethnicity, thus eliminating the 
constitutional argument.155  Ultimately, due to the facts of the 
crime, the court held that the attorney’s failure to object did not 
influence the jury to the point of harming Greene.156  If the 
attorney would have objected, the court noted, that objection 
149. See generally id. at 600.
150. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 63, 146 S.W.3d 871, 875 (2004).
151. Id.  The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed Greene’s prior murder charge
and conviction, which the jury in his Arkansas case “had considered as an aggravating 
circumstance.”  Id. 
152. Id. at 68, 146 S.W.3d at 878-79.
153. Id. at 68, 146 S.W.3d at 879.
154. Greene, 356 Ark. at 69, 146 S.W.3d at 879 (citing United States v. Cruz-Padilla,
227 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
155. Id.
156. Id. at 70, 146 S.W.3d at 879-80.  In Greene’s first case, the court held that “[t]he
evidence of a premeditated and deliberated murder is overwhelming, and, under such 
circumstances, the trial error was harmless.”  Id., 146 S.W.3d at 879. 
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would have been “meritless” and, in any event, did not merit 
finding Greene’s representation constitutionally inadequate.157 
Moreover, in 1994, Andrew Sasser’s story also presents an 
attorney’s failure to object during the prosecutor’s closing 
argument.158  Sasser faced the death penalty for the felony murder 
of Jo Ann Kennedy.159  The prosecution, during closing argument, 
harped on Sasser’s “lack of remorse” for his actions.160  The 
prosecutor’s statements posed rhetorical questions to the jury 
about whether they felt he was remorseful for the death of 
Kennedy.161  For instance, the prosecutor argued “that there is no 
role for mercy in the criminal justice system.”162  The court 
attempted to justify the prosecutor’s statements, commenting that 
“[s]everal [of the prosecutor’s] remarks look worse on paper than 
they did in the courtroom. . . . [The statements] were more a way 
of speaking than a flat statement and were understood as the 
prosecutor’s opinion about the evidence that was 
presented. . . .”163  The reviewing court reasoned that although 
some of the prosecutor’s comments were “‘technically 
objectionable,’” the court did not believe that the statements were 
prejudicial to the jury because of the “overwhelming” evidence 
presented against Sasser.164  During a post-conviction hearing, 
defense counsel testified that he rarely objects during the 
prosecution’s closing argument.165  Counsel did, however, testify 
157. Id. at 70, 146 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d
352 (2003)).  Greene brought other claims for ineffective assistance of counsel including his 
attorney’s failure to seek live testimony during the penalty phase, failure “to make a proper 
objection to an improper interpretation of an Arkansas law,” failure to challenge testimony 
made by the medical examiner, and failure to raise a constitutional argument regarding the 
introduction of “a T-shirt inscribed ‘If you love someone, set them free.  If they don’t come 
back, hunt them down and shoot them.’”  Id. at 63, 146 S.W.3d at 875. 
158. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 388, 993 S.W.2d 901, 909 (1999).  Andrew Sasser
also brought ineffective counsel claims for failure to object to the omission of an element 
from a jury instruction, failure to object to the testimony from a prior victim, failure to seek 
a limiting instruction, and the lack of representation by two attorneys.  Id. at 382-95, 993 
S.W.2d at 905-12. 
159. Id. at 379, 993 S.W.2d at 903.
160. Id. at 389, 993 S.W.2d at 909.
161. Id.
162. Sasser, 338 Ark. at 389, 993 S.W.2d at 909.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 390, 993 S.W.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
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that he would have objected if the prosecution’s statements were 
“‘absolutely outrageous.’”166 
2. Failure to Prepare for Trial 167
“Remember, as a lawyer in the case, you should know much 
more about your case than the Court.”168 
Preparation is defined as “the act or process of getting 
ready. . . . The type of preparation needed for a particular work 
varies.”169  Preparation is key to trial success170 and adequate 
representation.  “Trial lawyers have a singular goal: to persuade 
juries.”171  Without adequate preparation and investigation into 
the case, this goal is essentially unachievable.172  Mitigation is 
central to any capital case, requiring more preparation and 
investigation into what a lawyer can argue during the penalty 
phase of the trial.173  The type of preparation for the guilt and 
penalty phases are vastly different.174  For the guilt phase, the 
attorney focuses on the evidence and the law, while in the penalty 
phase, an attorney must present the defendant’s medical and 
social history.175  The art of preparation for a capital case requires 
unique skills that non-capital attorneys may not possess.176 
166. Id. at 390-91, 993 S.W.2d at 910.
167. While this Article profiles only two death row inmates under the failure to prepare
for trial category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim include Ray 
Dansby and Latavious D. Johnson.  Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002); 
Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515. 
168. Fred Daugherty, The Importance of Pre-Trial Preparation, STUDENT L. J., Feb.
1961, at 13, 14 (emphasis added). 
169. Preparation Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, [https://perma.cc/VC5L-
EU94] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (emphasis added). 
170. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 499 (5th ed. 2000).
171. David Berg, The Trial Lawyer, 31 LITIGATION 8, 8 (2005).
172. See id.
173. Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A Case for Making Mitigation the Heart of
Noncapital Sentencing, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 41, 41 (2013).  “[F]amiliarity with the mitigating 
force of social history may serve as a powerful basis for empathy and amelioration. . . .”  Id. 
at 42. 
174. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 266
(4th ed. 2018). 
175. Id.
176. Id.
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In Arkansas, failures to prepare for capital proceedings are 
abundant in scope.177  Failure to prepare for trial is illustrated 
through Zachariah Marcyniuk’s story.  In 2008, a Washington 
County jury convicted Marcyniuk of Katie Wood’s murder.178  
Marcyniuk went to Wood’s home, grabbed her, and stabbed her 
with a knife.179  For trial, Marcyniuk hired private 
representation.180  Marcyniuk’s counsel’s strategy was to assert 
the “mental disease or defect defense” during both his opening 
and closing statements at trial.181  However, Marcyniuk’s counsel 
asked the jury to return a verdict for second-degree murder, 
essentially voiding his own defense strategy.182 
At a post-conviction relief hearing, Marcyniuk’s counsel 
testified that his strategy was to use the mental disease or defect 
defense as mitigating evidence, not as a full defense.183  However, 
during the penalty phase of the trial, Marcyniuk’s attorney did not 
investigate or call the mitigating witnesses which Marcyniuk 
provided.184  Marcyniuk argued that the addition of the testimony 
would have prompted at least one juror to choose life in prison 
over the death penalty.185  His representation failed to investigate 
what the witnesses would have testified to and decided that 
“‘there is a problem with putting your friends on in mitigation, as 
they would essentially testify that they did not recognize that you 
were especially anxiety ridden or depressed[.]’”186  The court 
affirmed the conviction and held that he received adequate 
representation.187  The court reasoned that “[e]ven though the jury 
177. See, e.g., Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002); Johnson v. State,
2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515; Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, 436 S.W.3d 122; Kemp 
v. Kelley (Kemp II), 924 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2019).
178. Marcyniuk, 2014 Ark. 268, at 1, 436 S.W.3d at 125.
179. Id. at 2, 436 S.W.3d at 125.
180. Id. at 3, 436 S.W.3d at 126.
181. See id. at 4, 436 S.W.3d at 126.
182. See id. at 6, 436 S.W.3d at 127; Court Upholds Man’s Conviction, Death Sentence
in Slaying of UA Student, ARK. NEWS (June 5, 2014), [https://perma.cc/38DD-4563]. 
183. Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, at 8-10, 436 S.W.3d 122, 129-30; Court
Upholds Man’s Conviction, Death Sentence in Slaying of UA Student, supra note 182. 
184. Marcyniuk, 2014 Ark. 268, at 19, 436 S.W.3d at 135.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 19-20, 436 S.W.3d at 135.
187. Id. at 20, 436 S.W.3d at 135-36.
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was not persuaded by [counsel’s] trial tactics” Marcyniuk’s 
attorney’s strategy and decisions were “reasonable.”188 
Similarly, in 1993, failure to prepare for trial is evident in 
Timothy Kemp’s case.  A Pulaski County jury sentenced Kemp 
to death for the murders of David Wayne Helton, Robert Phegley, 
Cheryl Phegley, and Richard Falls.189  Kemp argued that 
Strickland required a new trial because his attorney failed to 
adequately investigate his “childhood abuse, fetal-alcohol 
exposure, and post-traumatic stress disorder.”190  Although his 
trial attorney presented mitigating witnesses and evidence during 
the penalty phase who discussed Kemp’s history with alcohol and 
abuse, the jury chose death over life.191  Later, in Kemp’s hearing 
in federal court for habeas corpus review, the Federal District 
Court judge recalled that “Kemp presented compelling evidence 
not introduced at trial: a deep family history of poverty and mental 
illness; a routine of trauma during childhood; and Kemp’s mother 
[] drank alcohol heavily when she was pregnant with him.”192  
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the 
state courts and affirmed Kemp’s sentence, holding that Kemp’s 
trial counsel took reasonable measures to satisfy his duty to 
investigate under Strickland.193 
188. Id. at 20, 436 S.W.3d at 136.
189. Kemp v. State (Kemp I), 324 Ark. 178, 186, 919 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1996).
190. Kemp II, 924 F.3d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 2019); Max Brantley, Appeals Courts
Sustain Two Capital Murder Cases in Arkansas, ARK. TIMES (May 16, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/6L8B-2Y49]. 
191. Kemp I, 324 Ark. 178, 186, 919 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1996).
192. Kemp II, 924 F.3d 489, 497-98 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 503.
2021 POST-CONVICTION 821 
3. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence 194
“Mitigation evidence enables the sentencer to consider the life 
and circumstances of the particular defendant in deciding 
whether death or life is the appropriate sentence.”195 
Finally, mitigation is a central part of an attorney’s job when 
representing a defendant facing the death penalty.  Mitigation is 
“[a] reduction in how harmful, unpleasant, or seriously bad a 
situation is; a lessening in severity or intensity.”196  The public 
empowers each juror to decide which pieces of evidence mitigate 
the maximum sentence before awarding an appropriate 
punishment.197  No textbook can teach an attorney how to 
convince a juror to recommend a life sentence over the death 
penalty,198 but it is defense counsel’s job to try.199   
Mitigation took center stage in Terrick Nooner’s story.  A 
Pulaski County jury sentenced Terrick Nooner to death for capital 
murder.200  Nooner met a college student, Scott Stobaugh, at a 
laundromat in March of 1993.201  Later that day, a surveillance 
camera recorded Nooner shoot Stobaugh.202  During the penalty 
phase of the trial, the prosecutor presented evidence of Nooner’s 
prior robbery charge, intending it to be an aggravating 
circumstance.203  Although Nooner informed his counsel that the 
194. While this article profiles only three death row inmates under the failure to present
mitigating evidence category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim 
include: Karl D. Roberts (Roberts v. State, 2020 Ark. 45, 592 S.W.3d 675), Alvin Jackson 
(Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003)), Roderick Rankin (Rankin v. State, 
365 Ark. 225, 227 S.W.3d 924 (2006)), Kenneth Isom (Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 495, 370 
S.W.3d 491), Thomas Springs (Springs v. State, 2012 Ark 87, 387 S.W.3d 143), Gregory 
Decay (Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899), Brandon Lacy (State v. Lacy, 2016 
Ark. 38, 480 S.W.3d 856), Zachary Holly (Petition for Relief Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, 
State v. Holly, No. 04CR-13-1 (May 18, 2018)), Mickey Thomas (Thomas v. State, 2014 
Ark. 123, 431 S.W.3d 923), and Derek Sales (Sales v. State, 2013 Ark. 218, 2013 WL 
2295436). 
195. CARTER, supra note 174, at 181 (emphasis added).
196. Mitigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
197. CARTER, supra note 174, at 266.
198. See generally id. at 266.
199. Id. at 266.
200. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 255, 4 S.W.3d 497, 498 (1999).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 258-59, 4 S.W.3d at 500.
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prior robbery charge was reduced to a lesser offense due to his 
protection of a victim during the robbery, counsel did not present 
that mitigating evidence to the jury during the penalty phase.204  
At the post-conviction hearing for relief, Nooner’s trial 
representation had no recollection of the reduced robbery.205  In 
denying Nooner’s request for post-conviction relief, the court 
held that even if Nooner’s representation knew, there was no 
reasonable probability that the jury’s decision would have 
changed if they knew about the changes to Nooner’s prior robbery 
charge.206 
Perhaps the most glaring example of an attorney’s failure to 
present mitigating evidence occurred when the Arkansas 
Supreme Court reversed the death sentence for Kenneth Reams.  
In 1993, a Jefferson County jury sentenced Reams to death 
following his involvement in the death of Gary Turner.207  Reams’ 
co-defendant, Alford Goodwin, was convicted and sentenced to 
life in prison for Turner’s shooting before Reams went to trial.208  
Essentially, counsel for Reams sought to blame Goodwin during 
Reams’ trial, although counsel later “testified that ‘[he didn’t] 
know when [Goodwin] pled in relation to [Reams’] trial.’”209  
Moreover, counsel declined to have Goodwin testify during the 
penalty phase.210  The court held that this constituted inadequate 
assistance of counsel.211 
Most recently, in 2019, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals 
declined to reverse a death penalty sentence for Justin Anderson 
on Strickland grounds.212  Although the jury heard forty-two 
potential mitigating factors at the penalty phase, the jury did not 
consider any viable.213  The defense provided a multitude of 
mitigating factors to the jury; however, many were “duplicative,” 
204. Id.
205. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 258-59, 4 S.W.3d 497, 500 (1999).
206. Id.
207. Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324, at 1-2, 560 S.W.3d 441, 445.
208. Id. at 2, 560 S.W.3d at 445.
209. Max Brantley, Death Penalty Reversed in Pine Bluff Killing for Ineffective
Defense, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/T8YS-Q6EA]. 
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 954-55 (8th Cir. 2019).
213. Id. at 953.
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including Anderson’s lack of a stable home life, and the fact that 
he lived in nine different places before he was sixteen.214  While 
his defense provided numerous duplicative mitigating factors, 
Anderson’s counsel failed to present evidence of Anderson’s fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder.215  Anderson argues that the addition 
of this mitigating circumstance could have pushed the jury to 
choose life.216  However, the court held that Anderson did not 
provide to the court “a reasonable probability that the jury ‘would 
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death.’”217 
However, one judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, pointed out that the defense counsel’s presentation of forty-
two repetitive mitigating factors was not helpful.218  Additionally, 
he added that “[i]t’s not just the quantity, but the quality of 
mitigating evidence that can make the difference between life and 
death.”219  Ultimately, counsel did not conduct a thorough 
investigation to reveal all the possible mitigating factors because 
they failed to present that “Anderson’s childhood was soaked in 
alcohol[.]”220  Anderson, indeed, had fetal alcohol spectrum 
disorder due to the excessive amount of alcohol his mother 
consumed while she was pregnant which continued during the 
early years of Anderson’s life.221  In fact, the capital defense bar 
community and its leaders encourage attorneys to use fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder  as a mitigating circumstance.222 
Although counsel knew that Anderson’s mother drank alcohol, 
they failed to further inquire about or investigate additional 
214. See id. at 958, 964-65.
215. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 964-65 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kobes, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). 
216. Id. at 954.
217. Id. at 958.
218. Id. at 953, 964-65 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. Id. at 965 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 963 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kobes, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). 
221. Id. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 964. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arkansas has used
FASD as a defense beginning around 1995 with Miller v. State.  Id. (citing Miller v. State, 
328 Ark. 121, 942 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1997)) (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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mitigating circumstances.223  Anderson’s representation even 
acknowledged, “evidence of FASD would have fit perfectly with 
the theme of the mitigation defense. . . not just that Anderson had 
a horrible childhood, but that it changed him physically.”224  The 
dissent concluded that the attorney’s behavior violated the Sixth 
Amendment.225 
Mitigation is arguably the most important evidence an 
attorney can present for a death defendant.  Mitigation also comes 
in many forms.226 Mitigation essentially demonstrates a 
“meaningful way to reject the death penalty[.]”227  Stated more 
plainly, mitigation is the attorney’s chance to persuade the jury to 
choose life for the defendant instead of the death penalty.  
Unfortunately, mistakes made by attorneys in the penalty phase 
are numerous and warrant reform. 
III. 
“Supposed to be reserved for the ‘worst of the worst’ 
defendants, the death penalty is handed down more often for 
those with the worst lawyers—not the worst crimes.”228
Criticism has followed Strickland in the decades since its 
issuance, particularly in the context of death litigation.  And 
perhaps rightly so.  After all, an attorney representing a criminal 
defendant facing the death penalty bears a tremendous 
223. Id. at 962-63 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Kobes
pointed out that the American Bar Association Guidelines state that, “[m]itigation cases 
depend on ‘extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family 
history’ that ‘begins with the moment of conception.’” Id. at 964 (citing ABA GUIDELINES 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003)) (Kobes, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
224. Id. at 965 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Id. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) “When counsel fail to ask
important questions [to their clients] and turn up crucial facts, that failure cannot be shifted 
to experts.”  Id. at 964 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
226. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 181
(4th ed. 2018). 
227. Id.
228. CASSANDRA STUBBS, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
2019: A YEAR OF INCREDIBLE PROGRESS MARRED BY UNCONSCIONABLE EXECUTIONS 
(2019), [https://perma.cc/HFP9-V5GE] (emphasis added). 
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responsibility.229  And in death penalty cases, competent counsel 
is essential.  This Article is about constitutionally guaranteed 
process—not innocence or guilt.  This Article does not purport 
that the Arkansas defendants are innocent; rather, even if guilt is 
present, each criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed 
competent counsel. 
While commentators have proposed a number of potential 
solutions, this Article argues that the most favorable is a 
straightforward approach: drop the second prong of the Strickland 
standard in death cases.  Section A discusses why funding is not 
a permanent fix to extend death defendants “more” adequate 
counsel.  Section B, then, illustrates how the American Bar 
Association’s requirements for competent counsel directly point 
to dropping the second prong of Strickland.  Finally, Section C 
illustrates how the lack of a prejudice prong would alter the 
outcome in the Arkansas Eight cases. 
229. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services
and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995).  See also Am. Bar 
Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases , 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 967-68 (2003) (“[O]ne 
study found that over the entire course of a case, defense attorneys in federal capital cases 
bill for over twelve times as many hours as in noncapital homicide cases.  In terms of actual 
numbers of hours invested in the defense of capital cases, recent studies indicate that several 
thousand hours are typically required to provide appropriate representation.”) 
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A. Funding: The Cronic Problem
“[H]elping criminal defendants is not a high priority for the 
public.”230 
Civil suits and more money will not fix the problem.  Public 
defenders represent the bulk of criminal defendants.231  Because 
of this, there is a “nationwide problem consist[ing] of ‘too little 
money, too few attorneys, and too many defendants.’”232  In 2019 
alone, there were 79,723 “active” criminal cases in Arkansas.233  
40,634 of the 2019 cases involve “distinct individuals across the 
state.”234  Of those distinct individuals, 26,499 were represented 
by public defenders.235 
In Arkansas, at any given time, many public defenders carry 
between ninety and one-hundred-twenty cases, each, all at once 
.236  Generally, that caseload collectively comprises about eighty-
five to ninety percent of the entire criminal docket.237  No public 
230. Bryan Altman, Improving the Indigent Defense Crisis Through
Decriminalization, 70 ARK. L. REV. 769, 782 (2017) (emphasis added).  Altman also points 
to a hearing from the Annual Conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association.  Id. at 782 n. 89.  The transcript illustrates that no answer will be publicly 
favored.  Id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE 
FUNDING 10 (John Thomas Moran ed.,1982).  At the hearing, a private practitioner 
commented: “What I’m asking you all here today as members of the bar is to realize this is 
a very very unpopular subject.  There is no public support whatsoever.  If we had to put it on 
a referendum, how much money are the people of Massachusetts willing to pay for people 
accused of crime, what would we get?  $100?  $200?  Do you think we’d hit four figures?  I 
doubt it. . . . If we are not willing to stand up for our indigent clients, then we have to stand 
up for the Constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel and equal protection of the law.” 
Id. at 11. 
231. Carrie Dvorak Brennan, The Public Defender System: A Comparative
Assessment, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 238 (2015). 
232. Id.
233. E-mail from Joe Beard, Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the
Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts (Mar. 23, 2020, 08:20 CST) (on file with author). 
Active is defined as cases that do not have a filed disposition.  E-mail from Joe Beard, 
Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts 
(Apr. 23, 2020, 1:07 CST) (on file with author).   
234. E-mail from Joe Beard, Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the
Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts (Mar. 23, 2020, 08:20 CST) (on file with author). 
235. Id.
236. David Koon, Arkansas Public Defenders Stretched Thin, ARK. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2015), [https://perma.cc/9L2W-9YNR]. 
237. Id.  Each client also has multiple cases.  Id.  An Arkansas Budget committee
member “gave the scenario of a policeman who pulls over a car for no tags and eventually 
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defender in those or similar circumstances could adequately 
prepare his or her entire case-load for trial.238  The National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
(NAC) recommends that one attorney should not manage more 
than 150 felony cases per year.239  But, in Arkansas and 
elsewhere, many public defenders surpass this.240 
One managing public defender in Arkansas stated that public 
defense “a lot of times, it’s just the assembly-line practice of 
law.”241  This is not a new or surprising comment; there are 
frequent calls for more resources and funding.242  Indeed, public 
defenders nationwide face similar financial challenges and feel 
that “It’s impossible for [them] to do a good job representing 
[their] clients” because of budget cuts, staff reductions, and 
access even to basic resources.243   
But requests for increases to public defender funding raise a 
separate concern about where the money to support those 
increases will come from.  But as many cases indicate, more 
money is not the sole issue.  Consider United States v. Cronic,244 
arrests the person inside for DUI, possession of a handgun by a felon, possession of a stolen 
handgun and possession of a controlled substance.”  Id.  While the number of cases does not 
reflect only capital cases, the number reflects the multitude of directions that a public 
defender is pulled in on a daily basis.  See generally id. 
238. Id.  At the base-line level, to prepare for a jury trial, an attorney must meet with
his or her client, talk to all witnesses, send subpoenas to all witnesses that will give testimony, 
hire expert witnesses if needed, prepare an opening statement, and prepare questions for 
direct and cross examination.  See generally id.  “Because public defenders have so many 
cases per year, they can spend only minutes on each individual case, compromising the level 
of defense provided.” THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (2013), 
[https://perma.cc/PW57-C8TW]. 
239. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS:
ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE, 43 (2011).  The NAC, which is funded by the federal 
government, has a considerable impact on public defenders.  Id.  There is a lack of caseload 
recommendations in the practice of law and NAC fills this gap.  Id. 
240. See generally Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a
Good Job Representing my Clients., WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), [https://perma.cc/UW9P-
CYXQ]. 
241. Koon, supra note 236.
242. See id.
243. Peng, supra note 240.  See also GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 238, at 4 (“In
New Orleans, defenders handled on average 19,000 cases in 2009, which translated into 
seven minutes per case.  Minnesota defenders reported devoting an average of 12 minutes 
per case, not including court time, in 2010.”); Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public 
Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2008), [https://perma.cc/7AZD-F6KE]. 
244. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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a case the United States Supreme Court decided on the same day 
as Strickland.245  Just days before trial, Harrison Cronic’s counsel 
withdrew, and the court appointed new counsel for Cronic.246  In 
doing so, the court set trial for twenty-five days later, even though 
the government had “four and one-half years to investigate [this] 
case and. . .review[] thousands of documents during that 
investigation.”247  The Supreme Court was tested with examining 
whether Cronic’s newly-appointed representation adequately 
prepared for trial.248  Although the Court held that twenty-five 
days to prepare for trial provided sufficient time, it also 
recognized that preparing a sufficient defense requires timely 
appointment of knowledgeable counsel coupled with adequate 
preparation time and resources prior to trial.249   
That recognition mirrors the Court’s precedent established 
in Powell v. Alabama,250 Wiggins v. Smith,251 Williams v. 
245. Samantha Jaffe, “It’s Not You, It’s Your Caseload”: Using Cronic to Solve
Indigent Defense Underfunding, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (2018). 
246. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649.  In addition to the twenty-five-day disadvantage, the
“court appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice” and no prior experience litigating 
a jury trial. Id. at 649, 665.  The court held that these mere factors regarding the attorney’s 
qualifications did “not undermine[]” the conclusion.  Id. at 665.  The court went on to reason 
that “[e]very experienced criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case. 
Moreover, a lawyer’s experience with real estate transactions might be more useful in 
preparing to try a criminal case involving financial transactions than would prior experience 
in handling, for example, armed robbery prosecutions.”  Id. 
247. Id. at 649.  Cronic argued that twenty-five days is an inadequate amount of time
to prepare for trial, as litigated in Powell v. Alabama.  Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1474 (citing 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
248. See generally Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650, 662.
249. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662-63, 665 (1984).
250. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
251. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).  Seventeen years after Strickland,
Wiggins v. Smith seemed to gently challenge the Strickland decision.  Gallini, supra note 
116, at 351-52.  Surprisingly, Justice O’Connor, who authored the majority opinions in both 
Strickland and Wiggins, refined her own opinion about Stickland prejudice.  Id. at 319, 351-
52. Wiggins was convicted of capital murder, among other crimes, and was sentenced to
death.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16.  Ultimately, Wiggins tasked the United States Supreme
Court with deciding whether his counsel provided adequate representation during trial.  Id.
at 518-20.  During that trial, counsel did not introduce any evidence of the defendant’s “life
history,” nor did he seek professional assistance to prepare a report of Wiggins’ background.
Gallini, supra note 116, at 352 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515 (2003)).  Instead,
during counsel’s opening, he merely told the jury: “‘You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins
has had a difficult life.  It has not been easy for him. . . .  I think that’s an important thing for
you to consider.’”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515.  That’s it.  No details followed to describe his
“difficult life.”  Gallini, supra note 116, at 352.  Surprisingly, Justice O’Connor, unlike in
Strickland, concluded that the lack of investigation into a client’s life to gain mitigating
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Taylor,252 and Rompilla v. Beard,253 wherein it recognized that 
failure to prepare, failure to present mitigating evidence, and 
failure to gather mitigating evidence constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel.254  However, more money would not have 
granted Cronic’s attorney more days to prepare.  Cronic prompted 
a series of litigation regarding the lack of funding;255 even so, 
many public defenders still work hundreds of cases a year, utilize 
minimal resources, and conduct nominal preparation. 
B. ABA Standards Call to Eliminate Strickland Prejudice
The great weight of death penalty defense representation has
spurred the development of various and unique strategies for 
effective defense representation in death litigation.256  Consider, 
evidence “did not reflect reasonable professional judgement,” and, perhaps more 
importantly, if counsel had presented the evidence of Wiggins’ background, “there is a 
reasonable probability that [the jury] would have returned with a different sentence.”  Id. 
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 536 (2003)).  Her opinion reasoned that the 
jury only heard a small slice of mitigating evidence; however, ”[h]ad the jury been able to 
place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a 
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Id. 
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003)) (emphasis added). 
252. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  In Williams, the
defendants counsel failed to research his client’s behavior, which later was found to possibly 
have a mitigating effect.  Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1475. 
253. See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  Just two years after
Wiggins, the Court again appeared to retreat from Strickland.  See Gallini, supra note 116, 
at 353.  In Rompilla, a jury convicted Ronald Rompilla on all charges, including capital 
murder.  Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378.  However, the jury rendered its verdict after counsel’s 
failure to present significant mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  Id. at 381. 
Defense counsel presented Rompilla’s five family members’ testimony as mitigating 
evidence, but nothing else.  Id. at 378.  The Court held this rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Id. at 393.  Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion focused on the 
significance of looking into a defendant’s history.  Gallini, supra note 116, at 353 (citing 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 394-96 (2005)) (O’Connor, J, concurring).  Specifically, 
for Rompilla, Justice O’Connor reasoned that defense counsel’s failure “‘was the result of 
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgement.’”  Gallini, supra note 116, at 353 (citing 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 395-96 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
254. See Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1475.
255. See e.g., Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016); Hurrell-Harring et al.
v. State,
930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010); Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D.
Wash. 2013).
256. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Am. Bar Ass’n,
supra note 229, at 923 (quoting Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995)). 
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for instance, the guidance provided by the American Bar 
Association: 
[D]efending a capital case is an intellectually rigorous
enterprise, requiring command of the rules unique to capital 
litigation and constant vigilance in keeping abreast of new 
developments in a volatile and highly nuanced area of the law.257 
Wholly apart from ABA guidance, capital defense attorneys, 
typically, must first satisfy rigorous state-level qualifications in 
order to handle capital cases.258  Despite quality assurance efforts, 
no one remains happy with Strickland.  Questions about defense 
attorney competency therefore persists—and especially so in 
Arkansas. 
At the core of criminal representation is professional 
competence.  The commonality of death defendants manifests 
itself through representation that falls below the standards 
expected by the American Bar Association.  Under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the American Bar Association 
categorizes lawyer competency into four classifications: (1) 
“Legal Knowledge and Skill,” (2) “Thoroughness and 
Preparation,” (3) “Retaining or Contracting With Other 
Lawyers,” and (4) “Maintaining Competence.”259  By eliminating 
Strickland prejudice, death defendants will receive 
constitutionally competent representation as outlined by the 
American Bar Association’s professional conduct requirements.   
Objecting, preparing for trial, and presenting mitigating 
evidence all fit squarely within the categories of lawyer 
257. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 229, at 923 (quoting Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. 
L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995)).
258. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5.  In Arkansas, the requirement to qualify to be the lead
death penalty attorney is three years of experience practicing law, prior experience as lead 
counsel in at least five jury trials regarding “complex cases,” and experience with at least 
one case where the death penalty was sought.  Id.  These are the main qualifications to serve 
as the lead attorney; however, there are a separate set of qualifications to serve on the defense 
team.  Id. 
259. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r 1.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018) (emphasis
omitted). 
Additionally, the rule itself expressly states, “A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
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competency requirements.  The American Bar Association’s 
second category, “Thoroughness and Preparation,” expressly 
“includes adequate preparation.”260  Further, the thoroughness 
and preparation requirements recognize the need to alter “[t]he 
required attention and preparation are determined in part by what 
is at stake. . . .”261  The rules also indicate that even if an attorney 
is lacking in prior experience, the “lawyer can provide adequate 
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary 
study.”262  Compliance with professional conduct and ethics are 
at the center of the legal profession.263  These rules ensure that 
clients receive adequate and competent counsel. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide a standard 
for ineffective counsel in Strickland, the Court’s test continually 
precludes meaningful appellate review of whether trial counsel 
was, in fact, effective.264  Arkansas juries decided all of the 
Arkansas Eight inmates’ cases discussed in this article, as well as 
the remaining thirty Arkansas death row inmates.265  Juries are 
unpredictable and, in any given case, may choose life over death, 
or death over life, perhaps only on the basis of just one statement 
from either side.266  In a capital case, the second prong, the 
requirement to prove prejudice, is often an unattainable burden 
which a post-conviction attorney must attempt to prove. 
Without the need for an appellant litigant to prove the second 
prong of Strickland, the stories of each Arkansas Eight defendant, 
as well as other death row inmates, might have turned out 
differently.  In reliance on the second prong of the Strickland 
standard, Arkansas courts uniformly concluded that all of the 
Arkansas Eight received constitutionally accepted 
260. Id. (emphasis omitted).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See generally Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Standard Lawyer Behavior?
Professionalism as an Essential Standard for ABA Accreditation, 42 N.M. L. REV. 33 (2012).  
“Lawyers must be able to represent and competently advocate for their clients without 
succumbing to behavior that is not commensurate with the esteemed position of the 
legal profession.”  Id. at 43. 
264. See infra Part I & Part II.
265. See infra Part I & Part II.
266. See generally Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making:
Implications for and from Psychology, 20 ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. 63 (2011). 
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representation.267  From attorney errors regarding failure to 
object, to failure to present mitigating evidence, to failure to 
challenge a six-year-old’s testimony, the unavoidable question 
arises: would the result have been different but for the prejudice 
prong?268   
C. Imagine the Executed Arkansas Eight Without Strickland
Prejudice 
Consider how appellate review might proceed without 
Strickland prejudice.  Ledell Lee, Marcel Williams, Jack Jones, 
and Kenneth Williams, were executed in April of 2017 without 
Strickland prejudice.269  Recall the facts.  Ledell Lee’s counsel 
failed to object to the prosecution’s egregious statements to the 
jury, which painted Lee as a “hunter,” because counsel admitted 
that he “just missed it.”270  Nevertheless, the reviewing court held 
no prejudice existed, and Lee was executed.271  Without the 
requirement to address the prejudice prong, the reviewing court 
would have focused solely on whether counsel provided 
professionally reasonable representation.  In Lee’s case, recall the 
court’s conclusion that counsel’s lack of objection “was clearly 
not part of his strategy because he testified at the August 2007 
hearing that he ‘just missed it.’”272  Lee would, therefore, still be 
alive and likely be awarded a new trial with different counsel.  
More importantly, such a holding signals that the court demands 
more from defense attorneys. 
Next, recall that Marcel Williams’ counsel failed to present 
mitigating evidence to the jury.273  Counsel testified during a post-
conviction review hearing that “[i]t wasn’t that [they] didn’t have 
mitigation, [it was] that [they] were ignorant of how to present it 
267. See Infra Part I for Arkansas Eight profiles.
268. See Infra Part I for Arkansas Eight profiles.
269. Jamiles Lartey, Arkansas Executions: Profiles of the Eight Death Row Prisoners,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/7UWE-QW8F].  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
270. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d 596, 608.
271. Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 5.
272. Lee, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
273. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 371, 373, 64 S.W.3d 709, 711 (2002).
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without exposing him.”274  Despite that testimony, the court held 
that counsel was nonetheless effective even though counsel also 
testified that “they should have done things differently, they 
admitted that, at the time of trial, they did not know any other way 
to introduce the information about Williams’s troubled youth.”275  
However, the reviewing court did not address the prejudice prong 
because Williams made a conclusory argument for post-
conviction relief, which ultimately did not provide enough 
specific information for the court’s liking.276  Without the 
prejudice prong, a court may have put more weight on Williams’ 
counsel’s ignorance and awarded him a new trial.  Marcel 
Williams, however, was executed on April 24, 2017.277 
Recall Jack Jones.  Jones’ counsel failed to object to the 
state’s expert witness as well as the flagrant statements by the 
prosecution about the murder itself.278  Jones argued that without 
the expert’s testimony and the statements, the outcome “could 
have been different.”279  However, the reviewing court strictly 
construed Strickland, commenting that the standard requires 
proof that “the decision reached would have been different.”280  
Stated differently, the court decided not to address prejudice 
because Jones’ argument included could instead of would.281  
Without the prejudice prong, the outcome may have been 
different and Jack Jones may still be alive.  However, Jack Jones 
was executed on April 24, 2017.282 
Lastly, Kenneth Williams’ counsel failed to remove a biased 
juror who stated that she “felt very strong about the [death 
penalty.]”283  Williams’ counsel did testify that he would have 
excused this juror provided he had challenges left.284  The court 
decided that this did not carry a reasonable probability that the 
274. Id. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 380, 54 S.W.3d at 716.
277. Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 79.
278. Jones II, 340 Ark. 1, 5, 8 S.W.3d 482, 484 (2000).
279. Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 488 (emphasis added).
280. Id.
281. See id. (emphasis added).
282. Pilkington et al., supra note 79.
283. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 111, 251 S.W.3d 290, 295 (2007).
284. Id.
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outcome would have been different.285  It then follows that 
without the prejudice prong, the court may have found deficient 
performance sufficient for a new trial. However, Kenneth 
Williams was executed on April 27, 2017.286  These four executed 
inmates may still be alive but for the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Physical presence of counsel is not equivalent to competent 
representation.  Strickland, although important, has created an 
unreachable burden for criminal defendants to meet when 
claiming ineffective counsel.  Dropping the second prong for 
death penalty cases focuses the reviewing court’s attention where 
it should be—attorney competence.  If any defendant deserves a 
more focused appellate standard, it is death penalty defendants.  
Once the lethal injection is dispensed, there are no reversals, 
relief, or judicial assistance.  If any defendants deserve a 
heightened standard of representation, it is death penalty 
defendants. 
285. Id. at 113, 251 S.W.3d at 296.
286. Ed Pilkington and Jacob Rosenberg, Fourth and Final Arkansas Inmate Kenneth
Williams Executed, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2017), [https://perma.cc/SN6Y-7EVP]. 
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Arkansas Eight Inmates 























































*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
287. Williams I, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565, (1999).
288. Jones I, 329 Ark. 62, 947 S.W.2d 339 (1997).
289. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, 308 S.W.3d 596.
290. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002).
291. Davis v. State, 314 Ark. 257, 863 S.W.2d 259 (1993).
292. Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 430, 934 S.W.2d 179 (1996).
293. Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2009).
294. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002).
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Appendix B 
Current Death Row Inmates in Arkansas 

































County Failure to Prepare 
Latavious 




*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
295. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004).
296. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999).
297. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, State v. Lard, 2014 Ark. 1 (No. CR 2012-
173). 
298. Brief for Appellant, Gay v. State, No. CR-19-762 (Ark. Feb. 07, 2020).
299. Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002).
300. Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, 436 S.W.3d 122.
301. Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943 (1996).
302. Brief for Appellant, Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168 (No. CR 19-847).
303. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 414.
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Roberts305 5/24/00 Polk County 




Isom306 12/20/01 Drew County 




Holly307 5/27/15 Benton County 




Springs308 11/24/05 Sebastian County 





















Failure to Present 
Mitigating 
Evidence 
304. Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003).
305. Roberts v. State, 2020 Ark. 45, 592 S.W.3d 675.
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
306. Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 495, 370 S.W.3d 491.
307. Petition for Relief, State v. Holly, No. 04CR-13-1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 18, 2018).
308. Springs v. State, 2012 Ark 87, 387 S.W.3d 143.
309. State v. Lacy, 2016 Ark. 38, 480 S.W.3d 856.
310. Rankin v. State, 365 Ark. 255, 227 S.W.3d 924 (2006).
311. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 4 S.W.3d 497 (1999).
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312. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2019).
313. Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899.
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
314. Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324, 560 S.W.3d 441; Brantley, supra note 209.
315. Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. 123, 431 S.W.3d 923.
316. Sales v. State, 2013 Ark. 218.
317. Sales v. State, 2010 Ark. 320.
318. Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of
Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRATIC GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/BU6L-CLJV]; 
Courthouse Scuffle Leads to Mistrial in Mauricio Torres’ Case,  5 NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/868Y-YLF6]. 
319. Brief for Appellant, Smith v. State, No. CR-20-86 (Ark. Apr. 13, 2020).
320. Reid v. State, No. CR-18-517 (Ark. June 15, 2018).
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321. Brief for Appellant, Gardner v. State, 2020 Ark. 147 (No. CR-19-257).
322. Thessing v. State, No. CR-05-420 (Ark. Apr. 13, 2005).
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
323.  Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 318, 468 S.W.3d 782.
